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instrumental variable strategy, we show that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, the benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments (CAAA) were progressive. The CAAA created
incentives for local regulators to target the initially dirtiest areas for
cleanup, creating heterogeneity in the incidence of air quality
improvements that favored lower-income households. Based on
house price appreciation, households in the lowest quintile of the
income distribution received annual benefits from the program equal
to 0.3% of their income on average during the 1990s, over twice as
much as those in the highest quintile.
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I. Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that environmental policies are regressive (Fullerton 2011,
Banzhaf 2011, Bento 2013). This is in part because the costs of these policies tend to fall
disproportionately on lower income households, who generally spend a higher fraction of their
income on energy-intensive goods and are employed in larger numbers in energy-related
industries. There is also some evidence that the benefits of environmental policies tend to accrue
mainly to higher income households. Higher income households are more likely to be
homeowners, and thus are more likely to reap the benefits of any capitalization of environmental
improvements into property values.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully explore the distribution of the benefits of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), an important component in understanding the overall
distributional impacts of the program. First enacted in 1970, the Clean Air Act established
standards for the ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants with the goal of improving air
quality and protecting human health. Following amendments in 1990, the Clean Air Act began
regulating particulates less than 10 micrometers in diameter (PM10), for which the negative health
effects were deemed particularly severe. A county is designated to be out of attainment with the
standard if at least one of the monitors within the county had concentrations of PM10 exceeding
the standard.
Despite being the most ambitious federal environmental legislation to date, the existing
literature provides little evidence on the extent to which the benefits in air quality improvements
induced by the Clean Air Act and its amendments accrued to different segments of the population.
Several studies that have attempted to measure the distribution of the benefits of the program have
used locational equilibrium models and focused on a limited number of metropolitan areas,
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emphasizing within-metropolitan areas differences in the distribution of benefits that result from
general equilibrium adjustments in housing prices (Sieg et al. 2004, Tra 2010). Other studies have
examined the aggregate impacts on certain subgroups of the population, such as renters and
homeowners (Grainger 2012), but have not accounted for important differences in the impacts of
the program across households within these subgroups.
We provide new, compelling evidence that the benefits of the 1990 CAAA, measured by
capitalization of air quality improvements in housing prices and rents, were in fact progressive,
contrary to what these past studies suggest. First, we demonstrate that the air quality improvements
induced by the 1990 CAAA were highly localized, as local regulators had incentives to target the
areas around non-attainment monitors as a strategy to ensure their counties were in attainment with
federal standards. Second, we estimate capitalization of the air quality changes induced by the
program. For homes located within five miles of a non-attainment monitor, which we show to be
owned by relatively low-income households on average, our estimate of the elasticity of house
prices with respect to PM10 reductions is about -0.6. For homes located further away, which tend
to be owned by more affluent households, we detect sharply less appreciation attributable to the
1990 CAAA. Rental prices also appear to have increased in a localized fashion, but the
capitalization of air quality improvements into rents is substantially smaller and less consistent
than for housing prices.
Consequently, lower income homeowners tended to enjoy the greatest benefits from the 1990
CAAA, as these were the homeowners located in areas that experienced the largest improvements
in air quality. Based on house price appreciation, households in the lowest quintile of the income
distribution received annual benefits from the program equal to 0.3% of their income on average
during the 1990s, over twice as much as those in the highest quintile. Importantly, though, while
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poorer households living close to monitors benefited greatly from the reductions in pollution
induced by the 1990 CAAA, a larger number of households living further from monitors also
benefited, but each to a smaller extent.
Our main empirical challenge is to estimate the causal effect of declines in PM10 on housing
prices. To do this, we assemble a unique dataset and exploit a quasi-experimental research design.
The key components of the data are monitor-level readings of PM10 concentrations and tract-level
census data on housing prices, rents, and socio-economic characteristics. Combining these data
with attainment designations, we follow Chay and Greenstone (2005) in implementing an
instrumental variable (IV) approach to overcome biases from confounding factors that are
simultaneously correlated with pollution and housing prices. In Chay and Greenstone’s (2005)
work, which is conducted at the county level, county attainment designations under the 1970 Clean
Air Act serve as an instrument for changes in pollution over the decade. Our empirical strategy
differs in three important ways from that of Chay and Greenstone (2005). First, motivated by both
the degree of observed heterogeneity in demographic characteristics of households as well as
observed variation in air quality improvements within counties, we conduct our analysis of the
CAAA in the 1990s at the monitor level as opposed to the county level. Second, we rely on both
monitor and county attainment designations as instruments for changes in PM10. We use monitor
attainment designations as an instrument because it better matches the behavior of local regulators
and is a good predictor for the spatial variation in the drops of PM10 within non-attainment counties
with multiple monitors. Finally, instead of a simple binary instrument that only captures attainment
status, we use a more sophisticated instrument that reflects the persistence of non-attainment status
to capture differential responses depending on the severity of violations. Our spatially
disaggregated approach exploiting the behavior of local regulators allows us to uncover the
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incidence of the program in a more comprehensive way than past studies, and provides new
estimates highlighting how the program’s benefits were progressively distributed, with lower
income households experiencing larger welfare gains on average than higher income households.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of air
quality regulation and describes local regulator behavior in response to the CAAA. Section III
discusses the data we use in this study and provides some descriptive statistics. We describe our
identification strategy and detail our empirical model in Section IV, then present our results along
with robustness tests in Section V. We discuss the implications of our findings for understanding
the progressivity or regressivity of environmental policies in Section VI. Section VII concludes.

II. Environmental Regulation and the Clean Air Act Amendments
A. Particulate Matter Regulation under the CAAA
Particulate matter (PM) is a term used for a class of solid and liquid air pollutants. PM
originates from a variety of mobile and stationary sources, including motor vehicles, construction
sites, and power plants. With the 1970 Clean Air Act, which was an extension of the original 1963
Clean Air Act, the EPA was authorized to enforce a National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(NAAQS) for total suspended particulates (TSPs), which include PM less than 100 micrometers
in diameter. A nationwide network of air pollution monitors allowed the EPA to track TSPs, and
two types of standards were used to determine whether pollution levels were sufficiently dangerous
to warrant regulatory action. As the U.S. EPA (2005) states, “primary standards set limits to protect
public health, including the health of ‘sensitive’ populations such as asthmatics, children, and the
elderly. Secondary standards set limits to protect public welfare, including protection against
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decreased visibility, damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings.” For each standard, the
EPA considered both a 24-hour average and an annual average.
In addition to adding provisions for regulating ozone depletion, addressing acid rain, and
establishing new auto gasoline reformulation requirements, the amendments to the Clean Air Act
passed in 1990 began regulating particulates less than ten micrometers in diameter (PM10), for
which the negative health effects were deemed particularly severe. While particulates larger than
ten micrometers in diameter can generally be filtered in the nose and throat, those less than ten
micrometers in diameter cannot and may cause health problems if sufficient quantities settle in the
bronchi and lungs. The primary standard under the 1990 CAAA required that the three-year
geometric average of PM10 concentration for each monitor in a county be less than 50 ȝgm3. It
further required via a secondary standard that the 24-hour average concentrations at a monitor not
exceed 150 ȝgm3.
If any monitor within a county exceeds these standards, the EPA can designate the county
“non-attainment.” As part of a state implementation plan (SIP), a non-attainment county is required
outline its strategy to reduce air pollution levels in order to be compliant with the NAAQS. If
pollution levels continue to exceed the standards or if a county fails to abide by an approved plan,
the EPA can impose sanctions on the county in violation. These sanctions may include the
withholding of federal highway funds and the imposition of technological “emission offset
requirements” on new or modified sources of emissions within the county (National Archives and
Records Administration 2005).
B. Local Regulator Behavior
For a county to be deemed out of attainment, pollution readings from only one monitor within
that county need to exceed the primary or secondary standards. As such, in counties with more
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than one monitor, local regulators are likely to allocate a disproportionate amount of their effort
toward reducing PM10 levels around monitors with pollution readings near or above the federal
thresholds, as these monitors put the county as a whole at risk of falling out of attainment. 1
Auffhammer et al. (2009) provide evidence of strategic behavior among local regulators. They
show that the average drop in PM10 near non-attainment monitors located in non-attainment
counties relative to attainment monitors in non-attainment counties was a sizable 5.43 ȝgm3 per
year. They interpret their results as evidence that regulators target non-attainment monitors for
more aggressive action, and thereby minimize future expected costs for the county as a whole.
Additional discussions with EPA and South Coast Air Quality Management District officials
confirm such behavior. At the local level, policymakers have various ways to enforce the
regulations either directly through the CAAA or indirectly through related policies that will tend
to result in uneven reductions in air pollution across space. 2 In this paper, we leverage spatial
heterogeneity in monitoring and enforcement efforts within counties to measure the distribution of
the benefits of the 1990 CAAA.

III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section briefly discusses the sources and relevant features of the air quality, regulatory,
and housing and population datasets we use in the analysis. We refer the reader to the online
appendix for additional details about the data.

1

It is also well documented in the epidemiological literature that the relationship between mortality and particular
matter is non-linear. Dockery et al. (1993) estimate convex damage functions, providing further rationale for
prioritizing particularly dirty areas for cleanup.
2
For example, officials may step up inspections and enforcement at polluting facilities in dirty areas. Plants may be
required to install equipment to reduce PM and officials may use permitting rules to ensure that facilities meet
guidelines for regulated emissions. Construction sites and dirt roads may also be kept wet to limit dust. Additionally,
some areas impose direct regulations on the oxygenated content of fuels, more stringent zoning regulations that make
it harder for polluting facilities to locate in these areas, traffic alleviating policies and smart growth strategies to reduce
emissions from transportation, and paving of side roads.
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A. Air Quality Data
The PM10 concentrations were obtained from the Air Quality Standards (AQS) database, which
is maintained by the EPA. For each monitor, the database includes the annual mean concentrations,
the highest concentration recorded in any 24-hour period, the geospatial coordinates of the
monitor, and several reliability measures. For the purposes of our analysis, we restrict attention to
monitors with reliable readings. 3 Further, we require that monitors have at least one reliable
reading in each of the following sets of years: 1989-1990, 1991-1996, and 1999-2000. This enables
us to match concentration levels with decennial census data and construct instruments from middecade observations. 4 The reliability and timing requirements place significant demands on the set
of monitors, and as a result, our final sample consists of 375 monitors located in 230 counties.
While only a small fraction of counties in the U.S., these 230 counties are located in densely
populated areas and contain approximately one-third of the total U.S. population. 5 Observed
changes in pollution in our sample are also consistent with recent work using a broader sample of
monitors. Based on our sample, the average concentrations of PM10 declined by 19% in the 1990s,
which is consistent with the findings of Auffhammer et al. (2009), who rely on a much larger
sample of monitors.
We obtained the county attainment designations from the annual code of federal regulations
(CFR). While the EPA designates each county in the U.S. as attainment or non-attainment, not all
counties contain air quality monitors that meet the time and reliability requirements necessary to
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See the online appendix for more details on the requirements for reliability.
If a monitor has a valid observation from 1990 (2000), then that observation is attached to the 1990 (2000) census
data. If a monitor does not have a valid observation from 1990 (2000), but does from 1989 (1999), then the 1989
(1999) observation is attached to the 1990 (2000) census data.
5
Figure A1 in the online appendix shows the geographic distribution of the 375 monitors that are included in our
sample. Table A1 in the online appendix shows that 1990 PM10 levels are higher on average for included monitors
relative to the broader population of monitors. However, the decadal changes are insignificantly different across each
group. Further, in robustness tests, we relax the monitor reliability requirements.
4
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be included in our sample. 6 For the purpose of our analysis, we also assign attainment status to
each monitor for each year using the EPA’s rules. If in year t a monitor’s annual PM10
concentration is greater than 50 gm3 or its 24-hour concentration exceeds 150 gm3 more than
once, then that monitor is designated non-attainment in year t+1.
B. Demographic and Housing Characteristics
The demographic and housing data come from the GeoLytics Neighborhood Change Database.
This dataset aggregates decennial census microdata to normalized tract boundaries such that the
data are directly comparable across time periods. For the years 1990 and 2000, we obtained tractlevel data for the median owner-occupied housing value, median rental rate, housing
characteristics, and socioeconomic characteristics. A complete list of these variables appears in
Table A2 in the online appendix. 7
Using mapping software, we matched each monitor to a single census tract. We then calculated
the distance between each tract in the data and the closest tract containing a monitor. For the
purposes of our empirical analysis, we construct concentric ring buffers around each monitor at
distances of 0-1, 1-3, 3-5, 5-10, and 10-20 miles. The rings are constructed such that county lines
and lines equidistant with other monitors in the same county truncate the rings. The number of
tracts, or partial tracts, included in a ring initially increases with distance, but then declines,
reflecting the facts that tracts are larger in rural areas and that at larger radii, rings bump into county
lines and lines equidistant with other monitors.8 Following Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) and
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Figure A2 in the online appendix displays the 1990 attainment status for each county in our sample. The spatial
distribution of non-attainment counties confirms widely held beliefs of which areas are most polluted. The
southwestern U.S. (particularly Los Angeles), mountain cities like Denver and Salt Lake, and rust belt cities (Chicago,
Detroit, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh) are all in the non-attainment group. While some counties are persistently nonattainment through the 1990s, individual monitors show much more variation.
7
We omit tracts that have missing values for the variables of interest or report anomalous house price changes; for
further details, see the online appendix.
8
We illustrate the construction of the rings for the Chicago metro area in Figure A3 in the online appendix.
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Banzhaf and Walsh (2008), we aggregate housing and socioeconomic data for all tracts falling
within a given ring, using weights equal to each tract’s land area within the relevant ring multiplied
by its population. 9 Cumulatively, the rings cover 92% of total county population (see Table A3 in
the online appendix).
C. Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 shows PM10 reductions between 1990 and 2000 for monitors in attainment located in
counties in attainment, for monitors in attainment located in counties out of attainment, and for
monitors out of attainment. 10 The decline in concentrations for in-attainment monitors located in
attainment and non-attainment counties is 5.1 ȝgm3 and 7.0 ȝgm3, respectively. The out-ofattainment monitor group experiences substantially larger declines in concentrations over the
decade, 15.4 ȝgm3 on average. This pattern highlights the substantial within-county variation in
pollution driven by the CAAA and its attainment designations. As we would expect, and as
Auffhammer et al. (2009) also show, PM10 reductions are localized and center around monitors
responsible for inciting regulatory action. That the EPA’s non-attainment designations were
generally effective in reducing pollution levels is consistent with past work documenting the
enforcement of air quality standards under the 1990 CAAA (Henderson 1996, Nadeau 1997,
Becker and Henderson 2000). We further explore the spatial scale of pollution reductions
associated with non-attainment designations in the empirical analysis. 11
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When tracts are aggregated to a ring level, median house value and median family income lose their “median”
nature, but instead are weighted averages of medians.
10
A monitor is classified as non-attainment if it exceeds either of the EPA standards at some point during 19921997. A monitor is classified as county non-attainment if it is located in a county that is non-attainment at some point
during 1992-1997, but is not non-attainment itself. All but one monitor designated as non-attainment are located in
non-attainment counties.
11
In a series of tests, we examined how pollution levels and changes in pollution across monitors varied with
distance between monitors. In Table A4 in the online appendix, we find a strong positive correlation between PM10
levels in 1990 that diminishes only slightly as we move away from the monitors; however, it is still strong and positive
for monitors even 50 miles apart. More important for our empirical analysis, the correlation in changes in pollution
between 1990 and 2000 fades more quickly with distance, with the correlation falling from close to 0.7 for monitors
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Table 1 breaks out demographic and housing characteristics, including 1990 levels as well as
changes between 1990 and 2000, for tracts with monitors in attainment in counties that are in
attainment, monitors in attainment that are in counties out of attainment, and monitors that are out
of attainment. Consistent with Figure 1, the first row shows that monitors out of attainment had
higher PM10 levels in 1990 as well as greater reductions in PM10 between 1990 and 2000. It also
shows that the initially dirtiest areas near non-attainment monitors typically had lower initial house
values and income levels as well as higher shares of minorities and unemployment rates.
Figure 2 plots non-parametric relationships between a tract’s distance to the closest air quality
monitor in our sample and selected demographic and housing characteristics of that tract, including
median housing price, median rent, share of housing units owner occupied, median family income,
population density, share college educated, share white, and the unemployment rate in 1990.
Figure 2 highlights systematic variation across space for each socioeconomic variable; as the
distance from a monitor increases, median housing and rental values, the share of units owner
occupied, median incomes, share college educated, and share white all increase, whereas
population density and unemployment rates decrease. Figure 2 underscores the fact that the
monitors are placed in tracts that are systematically different than other tracts and the county as a
whole. This is a direct consequence of the EPA’s requirement that monitors be located in densely
populated areas. 12 We exploit how demographic and housing characteristics vary as a function of
distance to the closest monitor in the empirical analysis to help identify the distribution of benefits
of the pollution reductions induced by the 1990 CAAA.

within one mile of one another to around 0.40 for monitors 20-40 miles apart. The precise correlation depends on
which monitors we include in the sample and what time period we consider, but the pattern is the same regardless.
12
See http:epa.govairqualitymontring.html#montypes. Plots for 2000 characteristics are similar to those for 1990,
indicating that the characteristics of neighborhoods close to and further from monitors are fairly stable over time.
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IV. Empirical Approach
In this section, we outline our econometric approach to estimating the implicit value of air
quality derived from housing market data. We rely on the hedonic model developed by Rosen
(1974), which characterizes a market for heterogeneous goods and allows one to assign prices to
the attributes of those goods. We estimate regressions using spatially disaggregated data in order
to examine how the capitalization of air quality improvements varies across space, which, as
discussed in the previous section, has important implications for the incidence of the 1990 CAAA.
Our analysis takes place at the monitor level, with demographic and housing information based
on rings of different radii around each monitor. We separately estimate our models for owneroccupied house values and for rents; given a large fraction of renters are low-income households,
determining the impact of air quality changes induced by the 1990 CAAA on rents is important in
evaluating its overall distributional consequences.
Our basic specification is

'pi

T'PM i  'X i ȕ  H i ,

(1)

where pi is the natural log of either median owner-occupied housing value or median rent in area
i, PMi is the concentration of PM10 in area i, and Xi is a vector of area i’s housing and neighborhood
characteristics. 13 In equation (1), prices, PM10 concentrations, and the vector of controls are

13
The matrix X includes the following variables, all differenced between 2000 and 1990: total housing units, percent
of housing units occupied, percent of housing units owner occupied, percent of housing units heated by coal, percent
of housing units heated by wood, percent of housing units without a kitchen, percent of housing units with full
plumbing, percent of owner-occupied units with two bedrooms, percent of owner-occupied units with three bedrooms,
percent of owner-occupied units with four bedrooms, percent of owner-occupied units with five or more bedrooms,
percent of owner-occupied units that are single detached units, percent of owner-occupied units that are single attached
units, percent of owner-occupied units that are mobile homes, percent of owner-occupied units that were built 5-10
years ago, percent of owner-occupied units that were built 10-20 years ago, percent of owner-occupied units that were
built 20-30 years ago, percent of owner-occupied units that were built 30-40 years ago, percent of owner-occupied
units that were built 40-50 years ago, percent of owner-occupied units that were built 50 or more years ago, percent
of renter-occupied units with two bedrooms, percent of renter-occupied units with three bedrooms, percent of renteroccupied units with four bedrooms, percent of renter-occupied units with five or more bedrooms, percent of renteroccupied units that are single detached units, percent of renter-occupied units that are single attached units, percent of
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differenced between 2000 and 1990. This first-difference approach controls for both observable
and unobservable time invariant characteristics of areas that might be correlated with house prices
and air quality, such as climate and topographical features, transportation infrastructure, and
population density. In this time differenced specification, ș measures capitalization.
As Table 1 suggests, monitor non-attainment areas differ along several observable dimensions
from monitor in-attainment areas, irrespective of whether the non-attainment monitors are in nonattainment counties or not. In particular, monitor non-attainment areas have relatively low house
prices, low median incomes, low shares of residents that are white, high unemployment rates, and
low shares of houses with three or more bedrooms. 14 To the extent that these characteristics are
time-invariant, a differencing approach will sweep out these effects. However, changes in
unmeasured characteristics of locations that are correlated with PM10 and also independently affect
p might still bias estimates of ș. For example, expansions in local transportation infrastructure or
increases in overall economic activity could affect both pollution levels and housing prices. We
would generally expect such correlations to bias the coefficient on pollution toward zero.
We exploit the 1990 CAAA and its implications for local regulator behavior to address the
simultaneity that would otherwise exist between house prices and pollution. Our identification

renter-occupied units that are mobile homes, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 5-10 years ago, percent
of renter-occupied units that were built 10-20 years ago, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 20-30 years
ago, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 30-40 years ago, percent of renter-occupied units that were built
40-50 years ago, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 50 or more years ago, median family income, percent
of residents with less than a high school degree, percent of residents with a college degree, percent of residents who
are Black, percent of residents who are Latino, percent of residents under the age of five, percent of residents over the
age of 65, percent of residents that are foreign born, percent of households that are headed by a female, percent of
residents that live in the same house as five years ago, percent of residents that are unemployed, percent of residents
that are employed in manufacturing, percent of residents that are below the poverty line, percent of residents that
receive public assistance, population density, and local home price indices. Sample means for these variables at the
tract level are provided in Table A2 in the online appendix.
14
With regard to the changes between 1990 and 2000 reported in Table 1, changes in PM10 conform to our
expectations, but surprisingly, changes in median house values do not. While aggregate data at the county level show
that house prices appreciated more in non-attainment counties, house prices at the tract level do not appreciate in line
with changes in PM10. This lack of correlation highlights the importance of including other covariates that affect house
values in our specification.
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strategy builds on that of Chay and Greenstone (2005), who instrument for changes in pollution at
the county level between 1970 and 1980 using county non-attainment status in the mid-1970s.
However, following more recent work examining the more localized externalities associated with
environmental improvements (e.g., Gamper-Rabindran et al. 2011), we exploit heterogeneity
within counties in pollution levels and socio-economic characteristics as well as in officials’
behavior. Figure 1 highlights the substantial degree of within-county variation in pollution
reductions, which is in part driven by local regulator efforts to bring dirtier monitors in line with
the EPA’s standards. Our IV strategy therefore uses monitor attainment status as an instrument for
localized pollution reductions. 15 We also consider overidentified models that use both monitor
attainment status and county attainment status as instruments. Further, to capture heterogeneity in
the persistence of non-attainment and its potentially differential impact on the extent of air quality
improvements, our instruments are constructed as ratios of years out of attainment. Specifically,
our monitor (county) instrument is the ratio of years that the monitor (county) is out of attainment
to the number of years for which there is a record during the time span 1992-1997. With the county
instrument, the denominator is always six years; for the monitor instrument, due to some monitors
not having valid data for all years, the denominator can vary from one to six years. 16
The first-stage and reduced-form equations of the IV analysis can be written as

'PM i

MN i  'X i Ȇ  P i

(2)

'pi

JN i  'X i :  vi ,

(3)

15

Non-attainment could result from violation of either the annual standard or the 24-hour standard.
While we include in our sample only monitors that have valid PM10 readings in both 1990 and 2000, our ratio
instrument avoids further selection issues that might arise if we were to require monitors to have a reading one or
more particular years during the 1990s. As discussed in Section V.D., the results are similar when we use alternative
instruments as well as when we relax reliability requirements for monitors in the sample.
16

14

where the instrument Ni is equal to the ratio of non-attainment years during the time span 1992 to
1997. For șIV to be a consistent estimate of the effect of changes in PM10 on prices, it must be the
case that non-attainment status affects changes in PM10 and that, conditional on other observable
neighborhood and housing characteristics, non-attainment status only affects house prices through
its impact on PM10. 17 As Figure 1 suggests, and as we show more rigorously in Section V.A., the
first condition clearly holds. While we cannot conclusively show that the exclusion restriction
holds, we include an extensive set of controls and conduct a battery of robustness tests aimed in
part at mitigating concerns that any shocks to prices between 1990 and 2000 are not orthogonal to
shocks to PM10. 18
We apply the reduction in pollution measured at the monitor level to each ring, although based
on the reduced-form results presented below and the observed gradient in the magnitude of
pollution changes, there is reason to believe that declines in pollution tend to be larger in closer
rings than in further away rings. Given this, we would expect estimates of ĳ in equation (2) to be
upper bounds on the true reduction in pollution experienced in more distant rings. In turn, we
would expect the IV estimates of ș in equation (1) to be biased downward in absolute value for the
rings further away, meaning that the magnitude of the estimated effects could be larger than we
find. 19

17

Regulatory action in response to non-attainment could affect other pollutants besides PM10, such as ozone.
Changes in PM10 are more likely to be capitalized into housing markets given it is visible to the unaided human eye,
unlike most other air pollutants.
18
One concern would be if measures aimed at reducing pollution to achieve or maintain attainment (e.g., curtailing
manufacturing activity) independently affect house prices. However, we believe that with our extensive set of
covariates (including, for example, manufacturing employment), we effectively control for such possible channels.
19
To the extent that people were cognizant of possible increases in the stringency of pollution control measures
prior to 1990 and anticipated future air quality improvements in their local areas, we might expect prices to have
capitalized those improvements by 1990. While we do not believe that the general public was aware of attainment
status and likely future changes in air quality owing to the 1990 CAAA, if there were some capitalization of anticipated
pollution reductions by 1990, it would lead us to underestimate the impact of the 1990 CAAA.
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One concern is that if house price trends across regions are correlated with patterns of air
quality improvements, it could bias our estimates of the effects of pollution reductions on home
values. To address this issue, we include as a control local home price indices from Freddie Mac,
and specifically the conventional mortgage home price index (CMHPI). We use MSA-level indices
when available and state-level indices otherwise. 20 In effect, our estimates reflect the effects of
changes in PM10 on changes in prices beyond those that would be expected given regional price
trends. In robustness tests, we also consider pre-treatment trends in neighborhood conditions to
address concerns that neighborhoods in and out of attainment were on different initial trajectories.

V. Results
A. First-Stage Results
We begin with an analysis of the first-stage estimates of the relationship between nonattainment and air pollution reductions. The results for the 0-1 mile ring appear in Table 2. The
first-stage is identical for owners and renters, as the regressions include the same controls. We
show results from a just-identified model using the fraction of years between 1992 and 1997 that
the monitor is out of attainment as an instrument (column (1)) as well as results from an
overidentified model using both the fraction of years between 1992 and 1997 that a monitor is out
of attainment as well as the fraction of years between 1992 and 1997 that a county is out of
attainment (column (2)).
Consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 1, the results in column (1) show that, relative
to areas with monitors always in attainment, areas with monitors out of attainment experience an
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Results using home prices deflated by these local indices are very similar to our main estimates; these results are
available upon request. As a robustness test (discussed in Section V.D), we also consider regressions with region fixed
effects, which additionally control for any unobserved trend in home prices at the region level. The results are very
similar to the main estimates.
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11.9 ȝgm3 decline in PM10. Given the mean value of the monitor-level instrument is 0.4, the
average monitor in the non-attainment group experiences a decline in PM10 of 4.7 ȝgm3. The
overidentified model in column (2) reveals that both monitor non-attainment and county nonattainment are associated with declines in PM10. Again echoing Table 1, the results imply that the
largest drops in PM10 occur near non-attainment monitors that are located in counties out of
attainment, while smaller drops occur near attainment monitors that are located in counties out of
attainment. The coefficient estimates in the just-identified and overidentified models are highly
significant, and with F-statistics of 19 and 15, respectively, the instruments appear to be highly
relevant. 21
B. Reduced-Form Results
The reduced-form relationships between non-attainment status and changes in house prices
and rents appear in Panel A of Tables 3 and 4. We show results for prices and rents within rings
of 0-1 mile, 1-3 miles, 3-5 miles, 5-10 miles, and 10-20 miles around monitors, and present
specifications with only the monitor instrument and specifications with both instruments.
For homeowners (Table 3), there is a striking pattern across rings in each model, with house
price growth strongly positively related to non-attainment within close rings but increasingly less
related to non-attainment in more distant rings around monitors. This is consistent with reductions
in pollution that are confined to relatively small areas around non-attainment monitors. Indeed,
based on the reduced-form estimates, it appears that declines in pollution near non-attainment
monitors only occur within about five miles from the monitor. If the reductions in pollution were
more evenly distributed over a wide area, we would expect to see a stronger relationship between
non-attainment status of a monitor and house prices even in more distant rings around the monitor.

21

The corresponding first-stage regressions for each ring beyond 1 mile appear in Table A5 in the online appendix.
Results are very similar, but change slightly due to different values of the control variables.
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However, the results suggest that non-attainment status matters only for tighter rings around the
monitor. 22
The reduced-form results for renters in Panel A of Table 4 show a different pattern than those
for homeowners. With the exception of the 1-3 mile ring, where rents are positively related with
non-attainment status, there appears to be very little relationship between non-attainment and rents.
C. Second-Stage Results
In Panel B of Tables 3 and 4, we present the second stage results from our IV analysis for
homeowners and renters for each ring around monitors and for just-identified and overidentified
models. 23 We apply the reduction in pollution measured at the monitor level to each ring, although
based on the reduced-form results, there is reason to believe that declines in pollution tend to be
larger in smaller rings than in larger rings. Given this, we would expect estimates of ĳ in equation
(2) to be upper bounds on the true reduction in pollution experienced in more distant rings. In turn,
we would expect the IV estimates of ș in equation (1) to be biased downward in absolute value for
the larger rings.
Focusing on the homeowner results for the 0-1 ring around monitors and using the justidentified model (Table 3, column (1)), the IV estimates imply that a one unit decrease in PM10
increases house prices by a statistically significant 0.92%. The estimate in the overidentified model
(column (2)) is similar at 1.33% (which is also statistically significant). The implied elasticity of
house prices with respect to PM10 reductions is about -0.6. This is roughly twice as large as Chay

22

If it were the case that homeowners in more distant rings value air quality improvements less than homeowners
close to monitors, the results could still be consistent with more evenly distributed pollution reductions. However, as
Figure 2 shows, residents of more distant rings are on average much richer than those in closer rings, and past research
suggests that if anything, richer homeowners value air quality improvements more than poorer homeowners (Fullerton
2011).
23
For the interested reader, Table A6 in the online appendix presents cross-section and first-difference regression
results.
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and Greenstone’s (2005) estimate of the elasticity of house prices with respect to reductions in
total suspended particulates (TSPs).
The IV estimates of the impacts of pollution reductions on house prices get smaller, albeit not
statistically different from one another, as we consider larger rings of up to five miles around
monitors. Using estimates from the just-identified model, the increase in home values on average
in response to a one unit decline in PM10 measured at the monitor is 0.82% for houses 1-3 miles
from the monitor and 0.67% for houses 3-5 miles from the monitor. Echoing the reduced-form
results, we do not detect any significant capitalization of air quality improvements in housing
prices in the 5-10 mile ring or 10-20 mile ring.
Based on these results, we can calculate the implied marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP), the
annual dollar amount a household would pay to face one unit less of PM10. To convert house prices
to annual expenditure, we assume an 8% interest rate and a 30-year mortgage. 24 The implied
MWTP for a one-unit reduction in PM10 (in dollars) based on our preferred estimates are stable at
around $120-$130 for rings within five miles of the monitor. This MWTP estimate is consistent
with other estimates based on different data sets and identification strategies. For example, Bayer
et al. (2009) find a MWTP of $149 ($1982-84) using decennial census data and an IV strategy
based on long-range pollution transport. Bajari et al. (2012) use sales data from a single city and
estimate a MWTP of $94. Lang (2012) uses a panel of individual housing units and a similar
identification strategy as this paper and finds a MWTP of $212, suggesting aggregation bias is
minimal.
Meanwhile, the results in Panel B of Table 4 suggest that, with the exception of the 1-3 mile
ring, there is no discernible impact of changes in air pollution on rents. For the 1-3 mile ring, the

24

We choose 8% because it is roughly the average 30-year mortgage rate that prevailed during the 1990s.
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just-identified IV estimates imply that a one unit decrease in PM10 increases rents by a statistically
significant 0.32%. The implied elasticity of rents with respect to pollution reductions is -0.2.
Notably, for renters in the 1-3 mile ring, the implied MWTP is substantially lower than for
homeowners at only $27. These results imply that, for the 1-3 mile ring, capitalization of air quality
improvements in rents is only 40% of that in housing prices. 25
D. Supporting Analysis
We conducted a series of robustness checks and supplementary analyses, including
specifications incorporating pre-1990 trends, analyses using different sets of monitors, regressions
using alternative instrument definitions, and tests for sorting.
Robustness Checks – In Table 5, we show results for a number of other robustness tests for
homeowners. 26 First, we examine the extent to which pre-treatment trends in neighborhood
conditions affect the results. To the extent that neighborhoods that experienced large reductions in
pollution levels were already on an upward trajectory, we might attribute further improvements to
changes in air quality, when in fact they might have occurred even in the absence of the 1990
CAAA and regulator efforts to reduce local pollution. In Panel A of Table 5, we show results in
which we include as controls differences between 1980 and 1990 in log median income, share
black, log population, and log housing units. 27 We lose close to 20% of the observations due to
missing data in 1980, when the country was not fully tracted. Nonetheless, the results are
remarkably similar with the inclusion of these pre-treatment trends; the IV estimates continue to

25
Though more disaggregated, our results are consistent with those of Grainger (2012), who also examines the
effects of the 1990 CAAA on homeowners and renters separately. In Table A7 in the online appendix, we find
qualitatively similar results as his using alternative instruments and different specifications, although there are minor
discrepancies due to differences in sample construction.
26
Similar tests for renters are provided in Table A8 in the online appendix.
27
Information on home values is not available for tracts in 1980.
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suggest that a one-unit drop in PM10 leads to just over 1% growth in home prices over the decade
in areas close to a non-attainment monitor, and that appreciation is declining with distance.
We also consider how our restrictions on the set of monitors included in the analysis affects
the main results. Results using relaxed reliability restrictions appear in Panel B of Table 5. The
sample size grows by about 60% when we include monitors whose readings were flagged by the
EPA as unreliable. In part because of the noisiness of these readings, the strength of our first-stage
changes little despite the increase in sample size. Meanwhile, the magnitudes of the estimated
impacts of reductions in PM10 on home values are very similar to the main results. A one-unit
reduction in PM10 increases home values by 1-1.5% in neighborhoods within three miles of a nonattainment monitor, but by less than 1% in neighborhoods further from three miles from a nonattainment monitor.
Next, we experimented with alternative measures of non-attainment for our instrument. In
particular, instead of monitor and county non-attainment as instruments, we used the difference
between annual PM10 concentrations in 1991 and the actual standard as an instrument. This
captures the extent to which a monitor exceeds the minimum levels, which is predictive of the
magnitude of subsequent changes in pollution levels. As Panel C of Table 5 shows, the secondstage estimates of the effect of PM10 changes on house prices are slightly smaller than in our main
results, but again are qualitatively similar and still statistically significant for the 1-3 mile and 3-5
mile rings. 28
We also considered a variety of other robustness checks that, for the sake of space, we present
in the online appendix. First, the results change little when we restrict attention to tracts whose
boundaries do not change substantively between 1990 and 2000, which suggests that our estimates

28

The first-stage estimates for this instrument appear in Table A9 in the online appendix.
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are not being driven by any errors introduced in normalizing the geography (Table A10). Similarly,
if instead of using partial tracts when rings overlap, we restrict attention to whole tracts, the results
are very similar (Table A11). The estimated effects also change little when we include region fixed
effects, which allow for differential trends in house prices across regions (Table A12). In additional
tests, we exploit information about elevation, which affects air pollution concentration, as well as
distance from monitors to tract centroids; qualitatively, the results are similar in each case (Tables
A13 and A14).
In principle, one could take advantage of the cutoff rule determining attainment status to
conduct a regression discontinuity (RD) analysis in which one only considers a subset of the
geographic areas with pollution levels within a narrow window around the threshold. Given the
limited number of areas in our final sample, though, we do not have sufficient power to limit the
sample to the extent needed to conduct an RD. However, if we drop from the analysis California,
which has many monitors with PM10 levels that far exceed the cutoff for non-attainment status,
our results are very similar. These results appear in Table A15 in the online appendix.
Sorting – A potential concern in interpreting our estimates as the MWTP for air quality
improvements and in evaluating the distributional and welfare implications of the 1990 CAAA
more broadly is that households may relocate in response to changes in pollution. Households
could have sorted prior to 1990, such that those with the greatest distaste for air pollution lived in
the areas that were initially the cleanest, or also potentially in response to the pollution changes
induced by the 1990 CAAA during the 1990s, such that those living in neighborhoods with large
changes in pollution by 2000 were different than those living in the same neighborhoods in 1990.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that the characteristics of neighborhoods close to
non-attainment monitors changed little between 1990 and 2000, consistent with relatively little
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sorting in response to 1990 CAAA-induced changes in air quality. As an additional test for whether
there were systematic changes in households residing in affected neighborhoods, we estimated the
effect of pollution reductions on the change in the fraction of households that moved in the past
five years, population density, the number of housing units, and the fraction of housing units that
are owner occupied. In each case, we instrumented changes in PM10 with our measure of monitor
non-attainment. One would expect to see differential rates of neighborhood turnover in areas
experiencing particularly large changes in pollution induced by the policy if there were re-sorting.
One might also expect to see changes in the size of the population and housing stock in these areas.
The results of these analyses appear in Table 6. The results suggest that areas that experience
relatively large policy-induced reductions in air pollution did not see particularly large changes in
turnover rates, population density, housing units, or housing tenure. 29 Additionally, a test for
sorting based on a correlated coefficient model provides weak evidence of diminishing marginal
utility with increasing air quality and no evidence of preference-based sorting (see Table A17 in
the online appendix). While not conclusive given that there may be more subtle changes that we
cannot detect in our data, these results imply that the sorting and supply responses to PM10
reductions induced by the 1990 CAAA were not large.

VI. Distributional Implications of the CAAA
Earlier work on the distributional impacts of environmental policy typically found that
environmental policy is regressive, with the costs largely falling on lower income households and
the benefits appropriated by higher income groups (Banzhaf 2011, Fullerton 2011, Bento 2013).
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In additional tests reported in Table A16 in the online appendix, we also find little change in the age or racial
composition of affected neighborhoods.
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In this section, we take advantage of the IV results to explore the distribution of benefits of the
CAAA across households. 30
To the extent that the previous literature has examined the CAAA’s distributional implications,
it has largely focused on differences in impacts on renters and owners (Grainger 2012). Our results
suggest that, with the exception of the 1-3 mile ring, rents were largely unaffected by changes in
pollution induced by the CAAA. Given this, and that we will focus exclusively on heterogeneity
in the CAAA’s impacts across homeowners in what follows, we will if anything tend to understate
the progressivity of the program’s benefits. 31 We will consider welfare as measured by house price
appreciation and WTP proportional to income, two commonly used measures in the literature
(Fullerton 2011).
Table 7 extends the main results presented in Table 3 to assess the distribution of benefits
among homeowners in treated areas. 32 The first four rows provide summary information on median
house values, median income, the number of owner-occupied units, and the total value of housing
for each ring of the treated areas. Echoing Figure 2, both house prices and income increase as ring
distance increases. MWTP for each ring is calculated using the IV estimates (as described in

30
As Chay and Greenstone (2005) note, while the gradient of the hedonic price function provides the average
MWTP for a one-unit decline in air pollution, the calculation of WTP requires identification of the MWTP function.
An approach to obtaining this function is to make strong assumptions on its shape. Freeman (1974) showed that if
preferences are homogeneous and linear with respect to air quality such that the MWTP for clean air is constant, it
becomes straightforward to calculate WTP.
31
The IV estimates for renters suggest that, in general, either renters do not value air quality improvements or
landlords are unable to increase rents (allowing renters to appropriate most of the improvements in air quality).
Therefore, renters are either unaffected by the program or have actually experienced welfare gains. The exception is
the renters in the 1-3 mile ring. For these individuals, if they do not value air quality improvements, they would
experience a welfare loss due to the increase in rents. On the other hand, if they value the improvements by as much
as homeowners, they would have actually appropriated most of the benefits since rents increased less than housing
prices.
32
As Figure A4 in the online appendix shows, there is a large amount of income heterogeneity among homeowners;
in fact, in 1990, one third of homeowners had household income levels below the mean household income among
renters.
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Section V.C) and is displayed in the fifth row. 33 In the sixth and seventh rows, we report per house
appreciation as well as total appreciation due to air quality improvements for each ring; the latter
is calculated by multiplying per house appreciation by the number of houses. The trends observed
across rings for MWTP and per house appreciation reflect the results of Table 3; as distance from
a monitor increases, benefits decline. On the other hand, aggregate appreciation tends to grow as
distance increases. However, this is entirely driven by higher initial house values and a larger
number of owner occupied units in more distant areas (see the first and second rows).
Aggregating house price appreciation across rings and also extrapolating our results to tracts
around monitors not included in our sample, our results imply that the total benefits of the CAAA
for the entire country was $44 billion between 1990 and 2000. 34 By comparison, Chay and
Greenstone (2005) found that the improvements in air quality induced by the mid-1970s TSPs nonattainment designation under the original Clean Air Act were associated with a $45 billion
aggregate increase in housing values in non-attainment counties between 1970 and 1980.
The last row in Table 7 presents, by ring, WTP proportional to income. This number is
calculated by dividing annual benefits received from the CAAA by annual income, where annual
benefits equal per house appreciation due to the CAAA annualized based on a 30-year mortgage
with an 8% interest rate. WTP proportional to income is largest in the 0-1 mile ring at 1.13%, and
then declines gradually for the 1-3 and 3-5 mile rings. WTP proportional to income in the 5-10
mile is 0.47%, less than half of what it is in the 0-1 and 1-3 mile rings. The benefits proportional
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We use the magnitude of the estimate for the 5-10 mile ring despite its statistical insignificance, and we set the
coefficient for the 10-20 mile ring at zero due to its perverse sign.
34
For homeowners in our sample alone, we estimate that the total benefit of the program amounted to $20.5 billion
between 1990 and 2000. If we assume that renters value the air quality improvements as much as homeowners, even
when renters in the 1-3 mile ring pay higher rental prices, the total benefit of the program across households in our
sample is $30.1 billion. Given that our sample does not comprise the whole country, we scale up the benefits to account
for the additional 26 counties designated non-attainment by the EPA, assuming households in those counties
experience the same rates of capitalization.
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to income are zero in the largest ring. The higher values for closer rings indicate that the benefits
of the pollution reductions are larger as a fraction of income for those households residing in those
areas than for households living in more distant rings. Because households tend to be poorer in the
close rings, these statistics point to progressivity in the distribution of benefits from the CAAA.
Notably, though, while poorer households living close to monitors benefit greatly from the
reductions in pollution induced by the 1990 CAAA, a larger number of households living further
from monitors also benefit, but each to a smaller extent.
In order to examine how WTP proportional to income varies with income in greater detail, we
move away from the ring structure and examine the relationships between pollution reductions,
house price appreciation, and income levels across individual census tracts. To do so, we first
project the coefficient estimates from Tables 2 and 3 to individual tracts based on the distance
from each tract’s centroid to the monitor. Then we calculate WTP proportional to income from the
coefficient estimates and the tract-specific median family income and median house value. 35
Figure 3 displays the relationship between estimated WTP proportional to income and median
income. The dotted line shows the density of 1990 tract median family income across all tracts in
our sample; the average median family income is around $50,000, although as the figure makes
clear, there is some right skew to the distribution. The solid line shows estimates of WTP
proportional to income as a function of tract median income. WTP proportional to income is clearly
declining in median income over the range of tracts where the bulk of households live (up to around
$100,000). There appears to be some nonlinearity in WTP proportional to income above $100,000,
but there are very few households in that range. Overall, Figure 3 reinforces the results in Table 7

35

This analysis contains both treated and untreated tracts within 20 miles of each monitor.
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showing that lower income households benefit relatively more on average from declines in
pollution induced by the CAAA than higher income households.
We can further quantify the disparities in benefits illustrated in Figure 3 by comparing WTP
proportional to income across quintiles of the household income distribution. Moving from poorest
to richest quintile, the average WTP proportional to income is 0.30%, 0.21%, 0.15%, 0.14%, and
0.12%. In other words, the WTP proportional to income for the poorest quintile is over twice that
for the richest quintile. This again suggests that, measured on a household basis, that the
distribution of benefits of the CAAA were progressive.

VII. Conclusion
Using geographically disaggregated data and exploiting an instrumental variable strategy, this
paper examines the distribution of benefits associated with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA). The CAAA created incentives for local regulatory officials to target the dirtiest areas for
cleanup, leading to geographically uneven reductions in pollution that tended to benefit lowincome households more than high-income households. Using house price appreciation as a
measure of welfare, households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution received annual
benefits from the program equal to 0.30% of their income on average, over twice as much as those
in the highest quintile. Our finding that the program’s benefits were progressively distributed
among households runs counter to conventional wisdom on the distribution of benefits from
environmental regulation, which holds that such policies tend to benefit higher income households
more than lower income households on average.
Our analysis focuses on the incidence of the CAAA’s benefits as measured by the
capitalization of air quality improvements into house values. A complete welfare analysis would
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also account for the distribution any costs of the program not captured in house prices, which past
studies suggest may be regressive. Indeed, based on changes in the prices of purchased goods,
Robinson (1985) finds that the costs proportional to income for pollution abatement during the
1970s were about twice as large for households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution
than for households in the highest quintile. Assuming the costs of air pollution abatement were
similarly distributed in the 1990s, then given that our analysis suggests that benefits of the CAAA
for households in the lowest quintile were about two times larger than those for households in the
highest quintile, the total costs of the CAAA would need to exceed the benefits for the program to
be regressive overall. However, the U.S. EPA (2011) estimated that the benefits far exceed the
costs, possibly by a factor of as much as 30, which implies that the entire program was likely
progressive.
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Figure 1.—PM10 Concentration Trends by Attainment Status
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Note: The monitor sample includes all 375 monitors that are included in the analysis. A monitor
is classified as 'monitor non-attainment' if it exceeds either of the EPA standards at some point
during 1992-1997. A monitor is classified as 'county non-attainment' if it is located in a county
that is non-attainment at some point during 1992-1997, but is not non-attainment itself. All but
one monitor designated 'monitor non-attainment' are located in non-attainment counties.
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Note: The sample of 22,926 census tracts consists of tracts within included counties whose centroid is less than 20 miles from a
sample monitor. All values are from the 1990 Decennial Census. The graphed line is the mean estimated by local polynomial.
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Figure 2.—Socioeconomic Characteristics and Distance from Monitors
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Figure 3.—Proportional WTP and Income
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Note: The sample of 22,926 census tracts consists of tracts within included counties whose
centroid is within 20 miles from a sample monitor. Proportional WTP is calculated for each tract
from the first and second stage IV coefficient estimates in Table 3 and the 1990 median house
price and median income of the tract. Coefficient estimates from the ring models are assigned
according to the distance from each tract’s centroid to the monitor. Mean proportional WTP is
estimated by local polynomial. The income density is estimated by epanechnikov kernel.
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Table 1.—Summary Statistics for 0-1 Mile Ring, by Attainment Status
Monitor in
Monitor in
Monitor out of
attainment, county
attainment, county
p-value of means test
attainment
in attainment
out of attainment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1) v (2) (1) v (3) (2) v (3)
Sample size
255
93
27
1990
29.3
34.3
50.7
0.00
0.00
0.00
PM10 concentration
2000-1990
-5.5
-7.2
-14.9
0.02
0.00
0.00
1990
101,210
112,171
102,383
0.34
0.93
0.53
Median house value
2000-1990
11,056
16,499
3,938
0.40
0.39
0.20
1990
514
572
548
0.01
0.30
0.51
Median rent
2000-1990
27
7
-8
0.05
0.02
0.37
1990
37,230
42,242
35,576
0.01
0.43
0.01
Median family income
2000-1990
3,602
2,069
625
0.04
0.00
0.18
1990
52.0%
55.7%
52.8%
0.08
0.85
0.50
Share owner-occupied
housing units
2000-1990
0.2%
0.6%
0.2%
0.34
0.96
0.69
1990
49.9%
50.0%
45.9%
0.92
0.11
0.13
Share same house as 5
years ago
2000-1990
-0.3%
1.1%
2.6%
0.02
0.03
0.28
1990
70.1%
73.3%
63.1%
0.31
0.28
0.13
Share white
2000-1990
-6.2%
-9.0%
-9.5%
0.01
0.05
0.77
1990
8.9%
9.1%
10.0%
0.74
0.22
0.38
Share unemployed
2000-1990
-0.5%
-1.0%
1.4%
0.19
0.08
0.03
3,406
4,773
3,174
0.22
0.70
0.19
Population density (per 1990
sq. mile)
2000-1990
-3
217
220
0.02
0.05
0.98
1990
4,353
5,232
3,664
0.26
0.32
0.11
Total housing units
2000-1990
9
116
202
0.10
0.02
0.36
1990
9.8%
11.8%
15.4%
0.20
0.05
0.24
Share housing units
built last 10 years
2000-1990
-1.2%
-3.0%
-3.1%
0.11
0.25
0.95
1990
64.4%
66.6%
59.9%
0.20
0.14
0.05
Share housing units
with 3+ bedrooms
2000-1990
0.0%
-1.2%
-1.9%
0.04
0.05
0.45
Note: PM10 data are from the Air Quality Standards Database. Housing and demographic data come from the Neighborhood Change
Database. Housing prices and income are adjusted to 2000 levels using the CPI.

Table 2.—First Stage Results
(1)
Monitor non-attainment
-11.85***
(2.71)
County non-attainment

(2)
-9.71***
(2.67)
-2.79***
(0.81)
F-Statistic
19.17
15.37
R-Squared
0.29
0.29
Sample size
375
375
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in PM10 concentration. Both
regressions include the full set of controls listed in Table A2 in the online
appendix and use the ratio instruments constructed from years 1992-97.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the
Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at
the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
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Table 3.—Reduced Form and Second Stage IV Results for Homeowners
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
0-1 mile
1-3 mile
3-5 mile
5-10 mile
10-20 mile
A. Reduced Form
Monitor non-attainment
0.11*
0.07
0.10**
0.06
0.09**
0.05
0.03
0.00
-0.04
-0.06
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
0.06*
0.05**
0.06**
0.03
0.02
County non-attainment
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
R-Squared
0.68
0.69
0.77
0.78
0.77
0.78
0.80
0.81
0.79
0.79
B. Second Stage
¨PM10 (1100)
-0.92* -1.33*** -0.82** -1.24*** -0.67** -1.08***
-0.18
-0.44*
0.26
0.07
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.36)
(0.40)
(0.31)
(0.37)
(0.24)
(0.25)
(0.26)
(0.28)
R-Squared
0.68
0.66
0.77
0.74
0.76
0.74
0.80
0.80
0.79
0.79
Sample Size
375
375
375
375
373
373
370
370
334
334
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the natural log of median house price. All regressions include the full set of controls
listed in Table A2 in the online appendix and use the ratio instruments constructed from years 1992-97. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the county level. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 4.—Reduced Form and Second Stage IV Results for Renters
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
0-1 mile
1-3 mile
3-5 mile
5-10 mile
10-20 mile
A. Reduced Form
Monitor non-attainment
-0.04
-0.03
0.04*
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
-0.02
-0.05
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)
County non-attainment
-0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
R-Squared
0.59
0.59
0.63
0.63
0.62
0.63
0.63
0.63
0.57
0.58
B. Second Stage
¨PM10 (1100)
0.37
0.43
-0.32*
-0.38*
-0.14
-0.22
-0.08
-0.23
0.14
-0.06
(0.31)
(0.27)
(0.17)
(0.20)
(0.24)
(0.20)
(0.19)
(0.17)
(0.24)
(0.25)
R-Squared
0.57
0.56
0.62
0.61
0.62
0.62
0.63
0.63
0.57
0.57
Sample Size
375
375
375
375
373
373
370
370
334
334
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the natural log of median rent. All regressions include the full set of controls listed in
Table A2 in the online appendix and use the ratio instruments constructed from years 1992-97. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the county level. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 5.—Additional Second Stage IV Results for Homeowners
0-1 mile
1-3 mile
3-5 mile
5-10 mile
10-20 mile
A. Include Demographic and Housing Trends 1980-1990 as Covariates
¨PM10 (1100)
-1.56***
-1.23***
-1.24***
-0.28
0.09
(0.54)
(0.35)
(0.30)
(0.25)
(0.34)
Sample Size
312
312
310
308
272
B. Relax Reliability Requirements for Monitors
¨PM10 (1100)
-0.89**
-1.20**
-0.79**
-0.53*
-0.06
(0.39)
(0.46)
(0.32)
(0.27)
(0.29)
Sample Size
591
591
587
581
522
C. Instrument Based on Difference between 1991 Annual PM10 Concentration and
Standard
¨PM10 (1100)
-0.21
-1.06***
-0.97**
-0.48
-0.03
(0.47)
(0.33)
(0.39)
(0.37)
(0.28)
Sample Size
308
308
306
303
273
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a separate regression, which uses a similar IV first difference model to
that which produced the results in Table 3. Panel A is identical to the overidentified model in Table 3 except
that changes between 1980 and 1990 in ln(average family income), population density, share black, and total
housing units are added as covariates. Panel B includes monitors that do not meet the reliability requirements
discussed in Section 3, but the model and covariates are the same as the overidentified model in Table 3.
Panel C is a just identified model where the monitor level instrument equals max(0, annual PM10
concentration in 1991 - 50). First stage results for Panel C are given in the Table A9 in the online appendix.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
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0-1 mile 1-3 mile 3-5 mile 5-10 mile 10-20 mile
0.19
-0.20
-0.82
1.17*
-1.44
(1.21)
(0.91)
(0.79)
(0.69)
(1.26)
4.93
-0.52
-0.79
-0.67
-5.50**
(9.29)
(5.11)
(4.41)
(4.11)
(2.75)
Change in total housing units
-3.33
-23.05
-41.65
-46.60
114.08
(7.20)
(33.81)
(41.32)
(146.63)
(215.91)
Change in share owner occupied units (11000)
-0.74
-1.48**
-0.40
0.54
0.10
(0.76)
(0.61)
(0.55)
(0.41)
(0.49)
Note: Each coefficient comes from a separate regression, which uses the same IV first difference model that
produced the overidentified results in Table 3 and uses the same covariates except that the variable of interest is
removed. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct
for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.

Dependent variable
Change in share living in the same house as
5 years ago (11000)
Change in population density

Table 6.—Non-Price Responses to Changes in Air Quality
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0-1 mile
5-10 mile
10-20 mile
1990 median house value
109,968
130,242
141,333
1990 median income
40,742
49,156
50,461
Total number of owner occupied
245
1315
1606
2972
1566
units (thousands)
Total value of owner occupied
37
188
260
574
296
units (billions)
MWTP
129
126
120
51
0
Appreciation per house
5,206
5,040
4,634
2,730
0
Total appreciation (billions)
1.5
7.9
10.3
12.5
0.0
Proportional WTP
1.13%
0.99%
0.85%
0.47%
0.00%
Notes: All amounts are in 2000 dollars. Only areas matched to non-attainment monitors or monitors in non-attainment counties are
included in the calculation of the statistics presented in the table. Coefficient estimates used to calculate MWTP, appreciation per
house, total appreciation and proportional WTP come from the overidentified model for each ring.

Table 7.—Benefits by Ring
1-3 mile
3-5 mile
115,721
125,924
44,147
47,688

